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Edwards v. Edwards' involved a court order incarcerating a man
for failure to convey certain realty to his former wife as specified in a
divorce decree. The former husband-defendant had consented to the
court's jurisdiction for purposes of the divorce decree; however, he
alleged lack of jurisdiction to find him in contempt. The defendant also
alleged that he could not be punished for contempt until he had first
been found in contempt of court. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's order of incarceration for contempt. "The
description of the conduct of which appellant was found guilty is of
controlling importance and not the name by which it was character-
ized. ' ' 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court also stated that since the
appellant had consented to the jurisdiction of the lower court for
divorce purposes he was estopped from alleging lack of jurisdiction to
enforce the decree.
B. Grounds
McKenzie v. McKenzie' involved a divorce granted to the hus-
band-plaintiff on the grounds of physical cruelty. Action was proceeded
upon by the husband-plaintiff following an altercation between him
and his wife in which she fired several bullets at him. The wife later
attacked the decree alleging that one act of physical cruelty does not
constitute sufficient statutory cruelty to grant a divorce. The South
Carolina Supreme Court said that such cruelty did indeed satisfy statu-
tory grounds,4 and followed its ruling in Brown v. Brown' on this point.
However, in Guinan v. Guinan,' a case decided the same month
as the McKenzie case, the court held that one act of physical cruelty
in itself, does not establish "physical cruelty" within the meaning of
the South Carolina Code,7 unless the spouse instituting the action al-
L. 254 S.C. 466, 176 S.E.2d 123 (1970).
2. Id. at 467, 176 S.E.2d 124.
3. 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (3) (1962).
5. 215 S.C. 502, 509, 56 S.E.2d 330, 334 (1949).
6. 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (3) (1962).
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leges that he is in fear of life and limb by continued cohabitation with
his spouse.
An interesting physical cruelty question was raised in Vikers v.
Vikers.8 The husband sued for divorce on the grounds of physical cru-
elty and constructive desertion. The allegation of physical cruelty was
based upon the wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse for a
period of eighteen months. The lower court overruled the wife's demur-
rer and granted the divorce. The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed saying the demurrer should have been sustained and no divorce
granted, for failure of the allegation to fulfill the criteria for physical
cruelty as spelled out in the aforementioned case of Brown v. Brown.'
The astute attorney for the husband also attempted in the lower court
to pigeon-hole the husband's absence from the home as constructive
desertion. However, South Carolina follows a minority view, as ac-
cepted in Mincey v. Mincey,"° for the criteria constituting constructive
desertion. It was established in Mincey that to constitute constructive
desertion the complaining spouse must show that he left the marital
abode because of conduct which was sufficient in itself for a divorce.
The husband in Vickers was in effect requesting the court to overrule
Mincey. However, this the court refused to do and reversed the lower
court's granting of a divorce.
In Williams v. Williams" the wife sought a divorce on the grounds
of physical cruelty, alleging that she fled the marital home after a
physical and sexual attack by her husband. The husband answered by
denying such allegations. In a subsequently amended answer, some 15
months later, the husband counterclaimed for a divorce on the ground
of desertion. The wife did not object to the desertion allegation at the
trial court; however, she appealed to the South Carolina Supreme
Court objecting to the dessertion allegation, saying it cannot subse-
quently be used if it was not available when the husband first answered
her complaint. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that since
the objection had not been raised in the trial court, it could not now
be raised and was therefore mooted. The divorce decree granted to the
husband was upheld.
8. 255 S.C. 25, 176 S.E.2d 561 (1970).
9. 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).
10. 224 S.C. 580, 80 S.E.2d 123 (1954).
11. 254 S.C. 492, 176 S.E.2d 157 (1970).
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A retroactive application of an amendment to the South Carolina
Constitution was presented in Singley v. Singley.12 The wife was
granted a divorce via three years separation." The parties had been
separated since April 28, 1967, and the ground of separation for pur-
poses of a divorce was effective as of March 5, 1969. The husband
attacked the retroactivity of the time period for purposes of fulfilling
the requirements of this section of the divorce statute. He alleged that
the amendment to the divorce statute was prospective only, and calcu-
lation of the time period cannot commence before the date that the
amendment became effective. The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that by act of the South Carolina Legislature," the period of separation
is to be computed without regard to the effective date of the ratification
of the Constitutional Amendment. Thus, the court upheld the lower
court's granting of a divorce on the ground of separation for a period
of three (3) years.
C. Alimony and Support
Jeanes v. Jeanes 5 involved a man seeking termination of alimony
payments because of the acts of his former wife subsequent to their
divorce. The Richland County Court relieved the petitioner from pay-
ing alimony to his former wife as she had cohabited with another man
for two (2) years. The lower court avoided the question of common-law
marriage saying that it was irrelevant. The former wife appealed to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the
lower court. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court went one
step further and stated that such a cohabitation by the woman did in
fact constitute a common-law marriage, which of itself would be a
ground for termination of alimony.
In Lowe v. Lowe 6 a wife obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro
(legal separation) on the grounds of physical cruelty and habitual drun-
kenness. The wife was granted custody of their three (3) children and
granted $140.00 per month as child support. Although the wife had
requested more child support, attorney fees and alimony, they were not
granted. Thus, she appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court
12. 181 S.E.2d 17 (S.C. 1971).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101(5) (Supp. 1971).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20- 101 (Supp. 1971).
15. 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970).
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which reversed and remanded the case back to the lower court. It cited
the facts of the wife having expenses of $468.00 per month with an
income of only $410.00 per month. The husband made $759.00 per
month and lived with his parents. Thus, the court ruled that the trial
court did abuse its discretion in not granting the wife more child sup-
port and attorney fees as the wife would be unable to provide for herself
and children, and could not pay an attorney with the decision rendered
in the lower court. The high court reserved judgment regarding ali-
mony, as it was not mentioned in the decision of the lower court.
A rather unique case was presented in Towles v. Towles.17 The
husband and wife had previously engaged in numerous legal actions,
but appeared finally to have been reconciled when the wife signed an
agreement never again to sue her husband. Needless to say, the parties
were subsequently separated and the wife sued her husband for non-
support. The husband answered, and cited the aforementioned agree-
ment as a complete bar to any action instituted by his wife against him.
The lower court honored the agreement and dismissed the action. In
her appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the wife contended
that the agreement between herself and her husband was against public
policy being tantamount to releasing the husband of his obligation to
support his wife. This contention was agreed upon by a majority of the
court and they reversed the lower court decision, thus giving the wife
the right to proceed against her husband for support.
D. Appeal
In Rajeich v. Rajeichls an Air Force Major obtained a divorce
through default from his wife on the statutory ground of desertion. The
husband alleged that he was transferred from South Carolina to Maine
and his wife refused to accompany him. Approximately one (1) month
after a final decree was awarded, the wife sought to reopen the case
alleging the decree was granted upon mistake, inadvertance, or excusa-
ble neglect. 9 She alleged that both she and her husband executed a
mortgage on a home within the year period which her husband alleged
that she deserted him. It was also alleged that after the husband com-
menced the action, he returned to the marital home, inferring that such
divorce action had been abandoned. Although the trial court refused
to let the wife have a hearing on the merits of her allegations, the South
17. Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 18 (June 19, 1971).
18. 181 S.E.2d II (S.C. 1971).
19. This motion was made pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-609, 10-1213 (1962).
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Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the
lower court stating that the petitioner was entitled to her "day in
court".
An apparent paradox in alimony granted to a spouse is the case
of McKenzie v. McKenzie.2" Although the husband was awarded a
divorce upon the ground of physical cruelty, based upon an incident in
which his wife shot at him four times, the wife was awarded alimony
in the amount of $250.00 per month. Since no abuse of discretion was
shown to the South Carolina Supreme Court, they affirmed this case
in all aspects as decided by the trial court.
II. PARENT AND CHILD
A. Jurisdiction
Jackson v. Jackson"' involved an appeal by a husband after a
lower court had granted his wife more visitation rights to their children,
although the father retained custody. The mother, in an earlier action,
had attempted to gain custody of the children and upon failing to- do
so she filed a new petition for more liberalized visitation rights. When
this petition was granted on the prior testimony at the custody hearing,
the father objected alleging lack of jurisdiction in the absence of a
second hearing. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court decision stating that the mother had a statutory right to have the
visitation rights reconsidered,2 irrespective of whether a second hearing
had been held.
B. Custody
Two recent decisions by the South Carolina Supreme Court reiter-
ate two standard rules of law in the domestic court. In Crowe v. Lowea2
the court reversed a lower court decision which changed the custody
of the children of a dissolved marriage without any specific findings of
fact or introduction of testimony of the party aggrieved by the decision.
In Powell v. Powell2 the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated
20. 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970).
21. Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 15 (May 15, 1971).
22. This is expressly provided for in S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-115 (1962).
23. Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 19 (June 26, 1971).
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the criteria of "best interests of the children".5 In Powell, the husband
and wife agreed to let the paternal grandparents have custody of a
daughter prior to their divorce. The lower court awarded custody of
this daughter to the mother upon her petition for custody after her
divorce. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the lower court
must consider the welfare and best interest of the child involved before
making any custody change, and since the paternal grandparents were
not present at the custody hearing, the "best interest" of the child was
not determined." The case was thus remanded to the lower court to
make such a specific finding.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Miller v. Sammons,2t again
stated that often in custody cases a perfect solution is not available.
However, unless the trial court abuses its discretion by a "clear prepon-
derance of the evidence", the decision must be affirmed, as it was in
Miller. 21
C. Visitation Rights
In McGregor v. McGregor's the mother of the child was granted
custody with visitation rights given to the father. However, such visita-
tion rights were limited to the father visiting his child in Columbia
where the mother lived. When the father moved to Florence, he peti-
tioned the court for more liberal visitation rights i.e., to allow him to
take his child to Florence for the weekend. The lower court granted the
request of the father. The mother appealed to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, citing the child's asthmatic condition as her primary
objection. The court readily negated the mother's objection citing the
fact that there were capable doctors in Florence. This showed the
court's tendency to allow whatever is reasonable in visitation cases
always keeping in mind the "best interest" of the children involved.
WILLIAM H. ELAM
25. Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E.2d 552 (1963).
26. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Powell stated that the Family Court had
violated Rule 13, Rules of Practice and Proceeding in the Family Court in that no
specific "best interest" finding was stated by the Family Court.
27. 179 S.E.2d 724 (S.C. 1971).
28. Id., the lower court let the mother retain custody even after it was proved that
she was of questionable moral character. Since the father could not spend enough time
with the children the mother's custody was retained since she devoted most of her time
to her children.
29. 255 S.C. 179, 177 S.E.2d 599 (1970).
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